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Synesthesia is traditionally regarded as a phenomenon in which an additional non-standard
phenomenal experience occurs consistently in response to ordinary stimulation applied
to the same or another modality. Recent studies suggest an important role of semantic
representations in the induction of synesthesia. In the present proposal we try to link
the empirically grounded theory of sensory-motor contingency and mirror system based
embodied simulation/emulation to newly discovered cases of swimming style-color synes-
thesia. In the latter color experiences are evoked only by showing the synesthetes a picture
of a swimming person or asking them to think about a given swimming style. Neural
mechanisms of mirror systems seem to be involved here. It has been shown that for
mirror-sensory synesthesia, such as mirror-touch or mirror-pain synesthesia (when visually
presented tactile or noxious stimulation of others results in the projection of the tactile or
pain experience onto oneself), concurrent experiences are caused by overactivity in the
mirror neuron system responding to the specific observation. The comparison of different
forms of synesthesia has the potential of challenging conventional thinking on this phenom-
enon and providing a more general, sensory-motor account of synesthesia encompassing
cases driven by semantic or emulational rather than pure sensory or motor representations.
Such an interpretation could include top-down associations, questioning the explanation in
terms of hard-wired structural connectivity. In the paper the hypothesis is developed that
the wide-ranging phenomenon of synesthesia might result from a process of hyperbind-
ing between “too many” semantic attribute domains.This hypothesis is supplemented by
some suggestions for an underlying neural mechanism.
Keywords: synesthesia, sensory-motor contingency, simulation, hyperbinding, emulative semantics, frames,
embodied cognition, mirror neuron system
INTRODUCTION: SYNESTHESIA
Even though we are equipped with similar sensory mechanisms
and cognitive functions, the way we perceive the world around
us differs between subjects. An attempt to realize these individ-
ual differences as well as the commonalities in epistemic abil-
ities makes us more sensitive to the problem of understand-
ing the human mind. One of such extraordinary phenomena is
synesthesia in which the stimulation of one sensory or cogni-
tive pathway (the inducer) elicits stable sensory experiences (the
concurrent) in the same or another modality (Baron-Cohen and
Harrison, 1997; Mattingley et al., 2001; Ramachandran and Hub-
bard, 2001a,b). Some synesthetes have color sensations (e.g., red)
seeing an alphanumeric symbol (e.g., an “A” or a “2”), individ-
uals with another kind of synesthesia perceive colored spatial
moving patterns when hearing music or, more generally, sounds.
Other forms of synesthesia relate tastes, smells, visual, or tactile
experiences to one another in almost any combination. Poten-
tially, a huge number of different forms of synesthesia exist. The
prevalence of the phenomenon depends on the particular type of
synesthetic association with grapheme-color synesthesia being the
most frequent one (Cytowic and Wood, 1982; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz
and Nikolic´, in press). The most characteristic feature of gen-
uine synesthetic experiences is that they are non-acquired and
involuntary conscious perception-like experiences which remain
remarkably constant throughout the lifespan (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1987). These consistent inducer-concurrent pairings may easily
be differentiated from other, non-synesthetic associations. First,
because they are elicited by a stimulus that normally is not
associated with this additional, internally generated experience
(Treisman, 2005). Second, although the associated experience,
frequently color sensation, is as vivid and realistic as the veridi-
cal perception of the ink color, synesthetes always know which
colors are ink and which are synesthetic. This exhibits the opac-
ity of synesthetic phenomenal experiences (see, e.g., Metzinger,
1999). Simple consistent shape–color pairings that arise as a
result of learning and memory associations are not likely to pro-
duce synesthesia. Such pairings occur often in our everyday life
(e.g., the shape of a lemon is associated with the color yellow),
but these matches do not convert into permanent synesthetic
associations.
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PERSPECTIVE: COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS IN SYNESTHESIA
RESEARCH
One of the pressing questions in current research on synesthe-
sia is the distinction between “low-” and “high-level” synesthesia,
i.e., the problem of how to determine whether it is a sensory or
semantic/conceptual phenomenon. At first, mostly the low-level
explanation in terms of cross-talk of the senses has accumu-
lated supporting evidence and dominated the debate. However,
this appears to be merely a partial truth, since in many forms of
synesthetic association only the concurrents exhibit purely per-
ceptual features and inducers seem either to have a semantic
nature or at least also to involve cognitive aspects, linking these
types of synesthesia to high-level cognitive phenomena. Together
with other authors (Dixon et al., 2006; Simner, 2007; Jürgens
and Nikolic´, 2012) we propose that a full account of the cur-
rently investigated phenomenon should transcend the traditional
view. The traditional view is captured by the original compound
“syn”+“aesthesia”(Greek for union of the senses) and takes synes-
thesia to be a solely perceptual phenomenon, such that a sensory
stimulus of one modality elicits an additional perception in the
same or another modality (e.g., Baron-Cohen and Harrison, 1997;
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Cytowic, 2002a,b). A more
adequate understanding of the phenomenon should also take into
account phenomena that do not merely involve sensations. For
that purpose Nikolic´ et al. (2011) have coined the term ideaes-
thesia, idea+ aesthesia, meaning sensing ideas, sensing concepts,
and referring to the conceptual processing in synesthesia with per-
ceptual concurrents and conceptual inducers joined together (see
also Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012; Gómez Milán et al., in press). Such
a phenomenon can be explained by high-level semantic mecha-
nisms that guide the assignment and evocation of low-level sensory
concurrents. Another analysis relates synesthesia to the unity of
cognition and demonstrates that this phenomenon exhibits cer-
tain holistic epistemic ability integrating different mental faculties
into a hypercoherently unified conscious experience (Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz, in press). In recent work Werning (2012) construes
semantic representation as a form of non-symbolic composi-
tional emulation, where the content objects, properties, and sit-
uations are emulated by brain mechanisms. Synesthesia very often
involves inducers that are not strictly sensory, e.g., words, num-
bers, time units, musical notes, or personalities. Synesthetes may
exhibit inducer-concurrent pairs with a cognitive representation
of an abstract concept as an inducer and a sensory experience
as a concurrent: Thinking about the number three – irrespec-
tively of how the number is graphically represented, as “3,” “III,”
or “. . .” – may produce a concrete color experience. Synesthetic
associations are thus not merely cross-modal, but cross-domain,
where the domains may not only involve the various sensual
domains, but also the domains of bodily and emotional states
as well as domains of abstract, conceptually represented entities
like numbers or time units. Moreover, as we will highlight in
this paper, synesthesia may even cross the motoric and sensory
domains.
Evidence for this alternative perspective on synesthesia is get-
ting stronger. Recent studies suggest an important role of semantic
representations in the induction of synesthesia. The term “synes-
thetic conception” introduced by Grossenbacher and Lovelace
(2001) accounts for the conceptual aspects involved in synesthesia.
In the above mentioned time unit-space synesthesia (e.g., Smilek
et al., 2007; Jarick et al., 2008; Mann et al., 2009) subjects experi-
ence units of time, typically hours, days of the week, and months,
as being placed at specific spatial locations in reference to their
body. Semantic aspects of synesthesia can furthermore be iden-
tified in the “tip of the tongue” phenomenon or generally in
lexical-gustatory forms of synesthesia. Here the verbalization of
the stimulus is not necessary for the sensation of taste and the acti-
vation of the respective concept is sufficient (Simner and Ward,
2006). Cases of synesthesia that transcend traditionally denoted
sensory modalities can also be found in reading musical notes,
calculating, imagining, or just thinking of a stimulus (Frith and
Paulesu, 1997; Grossenbacher, 1997; Dixon et al., 2000, 2006;
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a; Cytowic, 2002a; Rich et al.,
2005; Ward et al., 2006). Synesthesia is also prevalent as an intralin-
guistic phenomenon in so-called synesthetic metaphors: “loud
colors,” “itching tunes,” “cold smell.” Here a concept from some
sensory modality is used to modify a concept from another sensory
modality. Interestingly, synesthetic metaphors can be commu-
nicated and are understood across subjects simply on the basis
of shared semantic knowledge and without the use of the rel-
evant sensory information channels (Williams, 1976; Yu, 2003;
Werning et al., 2006). Also, a substitution of familiar graphemes
with exotic, newly learned ones with the same meaning – the
letter “A,” e.g., now being replaced by a Glagolitic grapheme –
can result in a transfer of synesthetic color experiences in less
than 10 minutes of training (Mroczko et al., 2009). Therefore,
synesthesia seems to rely essentially on a certain interpretation
of the stimulus and the meaning that it has for the subject. To
account for these phenomena we have to assume that the mean-
ing of the inducing stimulus for the subject has to be read off
before the concurrent experience can occur. We can no longer
maintain that the synesthetic association is caused solely by low-
level hard-wired preexisting connections between sensory areas
(Dixon et al., 2000; Nikolic´ et al., 2011; Jürgens and Nikolic´,
2012).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS: SENSORY-MOTOR
CONTINGENCY, EMULATION, AND SYNESTHESIA
In philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience advocates of
embodied cognition propose that many features of cognition are
causally or constitutively associated with the physical body and
bodily actions of an agent. According to this line of thinking
the sensorimotor account of perception (known also as enac-
tivism) states that our senses mediated by different forms of
sensory-motor contingency explore the environment. The mind
is constituted by the sensory-motor contingency between the
agent and the world (Noë, 2005). The sensorimotor theory is a
high-level cognitive model of conscious experience in which sen-
sory experience results through the subject’s cognitive access to
a sensory-motor skill (O’Regan and Noë, 2001a). According to
this model, consciousness arises from representation of interac-
tions between organism and environment such as sensory changes
induced by different motor actions, i.e., sensory-motor contingen-
cies. Thus, phenomenal differences between various perceptual
experiences can be accounted for by different actions when using
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different sensory modalities; transformations in qualitative expe-
rience may well be explained in terms of a dynamic model of
interdependence between sensory or semantic inputs and embod-
ied activity (Hurley and Noë, 2003). Hence, a distinctive pattern
of sensory-motor contingency conditions the subject to act in
a manner such that the ways things appear to the subject are
affected. This results in a matching between bodily and envi-
ronmental features (O’Regan and Noë, 2001a,b; O’Regan et al.,
2006). The theory is supported by empirical findings regard-
ing effective sensory substitution, sensory-motor adaptation for
color perception or for touch as found for instance in the rub-
ber hand illusion and mirror therapy reducing phantom limb
pain (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996; Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Bompas and O’Regan, 2006; Proulx and Störig,
2006). Another sensory-motor contingency may be observed in
the matching between different modalities and domains. The
theory emphasizing these issues, called embodied social cogni-
tion or emulation/simulation theory, explains the phenomenon
of intersubjectivity as intercorporeity or visuo-tactile matching in
various positive symptoms employing mirror neuron systems and
other mirroring mechanisms in our brain (Gallese and Goldman,
1998; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). Mirroring others’ expe-
riences requires a mapping between the self and others. This,
indeed, may involve some of the brain mechanisms underlying
social competencies. Mirror systems may have evolved as an adap-
tation for interpersonal understanding (Gallese and Goldman,
1998). They refer to cortical areas that respond both to observ-
ing another person’s state and being in that same state oneself
(Gallese, 2003). Mirror systems have been reported in humans
not only for actions (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), but also for emo-
tions (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; disgust – Wicker et al., 2003;
facial expressions – Carr et al., 2003), and sensations (pain –
Avenanti et al., 2005; touch – Blakemore et al., 2005). Hence,
these mechanisms map the sensory representations of the sen-
sation, emotion, or action of an observed person onto the per-
ceiver’s own somatosensory, viscero-motor, or motor represen-
tations of the sensation, emotion, or action. Such a mapping
enables the observer of another person’s sensation, emotion, or
action, to feel as if he were experiencing that sensation or emotion
or performing that action himself. The mirroring mechanisms
represent sub-personal instantiations of embodied emulation,
i.e., respective neural activations for brain-body states associated
with sensations, emotions, and actions evoked in the observer
while observing social stimuli as if he were undergoing a similar
experience.
Generally speaking, an emulator is a device that mimics the
state transitions of a target system due to some structural mapping
(total or partial isomorphism, homomorphism, etc.) between the
states and transitions of the device and the states and transitions
of the target system. Emulators may thus have representational
content due to their structure and their transitional performance.
Being dynamical systems with representational powers, they may
also serve as forward models and generate predictions (Grush,
2004; Bartels, 2006). Emulation is a subcategory of simulation, but
typically contrasts with high-level simulation which might, e.g., be
based on global mathematical equations. In the cognitive science
literature the notions “emulation” and “simulation” are often used
interchangeably.
Embodied social emulations exhibit the relations that our brain
bears to other persons by mapping others’ sensations and emotions
onto our cerebral somatosensory and viscero-motor states, and
others’ actions onto our cortical motor states (Gallese and Met-
zinger, 2003; Gallese, 2007; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). These
brain states are themselves representational and represent features,
evaluations, and affordances of objects, events, and situations in
the world as well as states of one’s body and potential actions result-
ing therefrom. Emulation plays a central role in acquiring knowl-
edge about our environment (Gordon,1986,1995; Goldman,1989,
1992; Metzinger and Gallese, 2003; Thomas et al., 2006). Effective
perception or action requires the capacity of emulation in order
to predict impending sensory events or consequences of action
(Grush, 2004). Emulation is not restricted to the somatosensory
or motor domain. In the theory of emulative semantics (Werning,
2012), emulations are interpreted as semantic values that can be
linked to each other and thus become constitutive for concepts
(see below).
Neural mechanisms of mirror systems seem to be involved
in synesthesia. It is particularly vivid in forms of mirror-sensory
synesthesia, e.g., mirror-touch or mirror-pain synesthesia (Blake-
more et al., 2005; Banissy and Ward, 2007; Fitzgibbon et al., 2010;
Keysers et al., 2010). This implies that many aspects of everyday
social cognition can be conceptualized as synesthesia-like process-
ing. The already illustrated phenomenon of sensory-motor con-
tingency recalls other perceptual phenomena and mental processes
in human cognition supported by multisensory, sensory-motor, or
cross-activation mechanisms similar to those in synesthesia. In the
present paper, and especially in this section, we want to point out
the omnipresence of synesthesia-like processing and the relevance
of an emulation theory of cognition in explaining such experi-
ences. The reason for doing this is motivated by numerous studies
on different multimodal, cross-activation phenomena emphasiz-
ing the inductive role of sensory-motor processing and semantic
representations of the stimulus, such as mirroring one’s own body
or self and projecting it outside the body via the imposition of mul-
tisensory conflicts using congruent and incongruent visuo-tactile
inputs (Metzinger, 2005; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Ionta et al.,
2011; Ferri et al., 2012), autoscopic symptoms that occur when
patients hallucinate their mirror image (Zamboni et al., 2005),
undergo out-of-body experiences (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009),
double delusions (Brugger, 2002), or feel the sense of presence in
the widowhood hallucinations (Rees, 1971).
Inter-modal analogies outside canonical synesthesia are quite
universal. We can agree on such commonly shared associations
like experiencing higher pitch as lighter and smaller. Compara-
ble evidence of correspondences between different domains exist
for vision and touch (see, e.g., mirror-touch synesthesia, rubber
hand and full body illusions) and is based on vicarious activation,
activation of a brain region that is typically involved in process-
ing the observer’s own actions and sensations, but that is now
activated by seeing similar actions or sensations in another per-
son. The observation of touch has long been considered a solely
visual event. However, recent studies suggest the involvement of
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vicarious activations in somatosensation, i.e., that a somatosen-
sory component is also activated in the observer. Observed touch
is processed in visual parts of the brain and in somatosensory
areas (Ebisch et al., 2008, 2011; Keysers et al., 2010). Watching
another person being touched usually activates a neural circuit
similar to that of the actual touch. Only “similar” because at the
neural level the overlap is not total between one’s own experiences
and the experiences observed in someone else. In the former case
both primary and secondary somatosensory cortices (SI and SII)
are activated. However, while observing the touch only vicarious
activation in the secondary somatosensory cortex occurs (Key-
sers et al., 2010). Despite this vicarious SII activation, in daily life
we are not confused about who is being touched. This is because
the primary somatosensory cortex including the Brodmann’s area
[BA] 3, is only recruited when we ourselves are being touched.
This fact seems to shed some light on the functional foundation
of the neural mechanisms underlying mirror-sensory synesthe-
sia, explaining why certain people have conscious somatosensory
experience during the observation of similar stimulation applied
to another person. Here, the inducer is the “observed bodily
touch,” rather than vision per se. Depending on whether this
stimulus is applied to a synesthete or to a non-synesthete, an obser-
vation of touched body parts affects somatosensory activation
and experiences to a different extent. A recent fMRI study with
non-synesthetic healthy subjects shows that some brain regions
involved in first-person sensory experiences appear to actively
distinguish between self and other conditions, in the sense that
they are positively modulated (activated) for first-person sensory
experiences, but negatively modulated (deactivated) when observ-
ing these experiences in others. The specific pattern of negative
modulation has been detected in the posterior insula for sub-
jects watching affective social touch applied to other individuals.
In contrast to this vicarious activation, a positive modulation in
somatosensory regions has been found for the actual tactile expe-
rience. The posterior insula, embedded in a distributed network
grounding a sense of the bodily self, seems to differentiate between
self and others when affective experiences are implicated (Ebisch
et al., 2011). The mentioned partial overlap and deactivation
processes, may be responsible in the general population for not
experiencing others’ experiences during social perception. They
may explain why usually no synesthetic experiences occur when
we simulate or mirror others’ bodily experiences. Alterations at
this level could result in sensory experiences also when perceiving
them in others as this is the case in experimentally or neurologi-
cally induced illusory situations (e.g., out-of-body experiences) or
specific individuals such as mirror-sensory synesthetes.
Amputation or paralysis of a limb is frequently accompa-
nied by tactile, painful, or motoric sensations in the location of
the missing limb, a so-called phantom limb. Ramachandran and
Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) used mirrors to create a duplicate
image of the amputated arm based on a reflection of the patient’s
existing arm. Observed movement or touch at the intact arm pro-
duced the identical proprioceptive sensations at the phantom limb.
This synesthesia-like processing can be conceived of as a behav-
iorally induced form of synesthesia or a temporal sensory substitu-
tion. The phenomenon of synesthesia as well as others including
cross-activation and mirroring mechanisms distinctly exhibit a
multimodal integration and multisensory awareness of selfhood.
Both of them seem to be necessary conditions for pre-reflective
bodily self-consciousness.
The construction of one’s own body image requires an inte-
gration of multimodal information from such different sources
as visual, haptic, and proprioceptive perception. Interactions
between these different domains may also yield specific self-
identification and embodiment illusions like the enfacement illu-
sion (Sforza et al., 2010), the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998) or the full body illusion induced on purpose in the
lab with a virtual reality apparatus (Lenggenhager et al., 2007)
or due to some neurological origin (Blanke et al., 2004). Study-
ing the mentioned illusions and alterations of the body image
based on a synesthesia-like processing caused by the interper-
sonal multisensory stimulation (felt touch and vision of touch)
provides a promising tool for learning more about the neural
representations of stimulated body parts as well as about the attri-
bution, localization, and ownership of the bodily self (Tsakiris,
2008). Studies measuring visual-somatosensory spatial congru-
ency effects for the full body and subjective changes in global bodily
self-consciousness have shown that during incongruent trials, i.e.,
conflicting visuo-tactile input, tactile stimuli were mislocalized
toward the observed body. Since no such tests have been done
with mirror-somatosensory synesthetes, aside from studies reveal-
ing that these subjects have difficulties with distinguishing between
actual and synesthetic touch (Banissy et al., 2009), future research
should concentrate on discriminating differential brain activations
related to cross-modal conflicts also in specific individuals (Aspell
et al., 2009).
The difference between the above mentioned autoscopic phe-
nomena and shared multisensory experiences in the mirror-
(somato)sensory synesthesia such as mirror-touch or mirror-pain
synesthesia is that in the former case the body is visually mir-
rored, and in the latter one – visually presented tactile or noxious
stimulation of others results in a somatosensory activation in
oneself, i.e., in the projection of the conscious tactile or pain
experience onto the respective part of the observer’s body (Blake-
more et al., 2005; Banissy et al., 2009). Mirror-sensory synesthetes
feel on their bodies what observed people are feeling when they
are really touched. Also in this form of synesthesia concurrents
can be experienced even by simply thinking of the inducers,
e.g., when imagining another person in pain (Fitzgibbon et al.,
2012) or anticipating such an experience. It has been shown that
anticipation of somatosensation can increase activation in the
primary somatosensory cortex without actual stimulation (Carls-
son et al., 2000). However, inducer-concurrent correspondences
are not so individual here as in other forms. They are much
more regular and dependent on the stimulus. For instance, the
intensity of the felt touch is stronger when observed touch is
applied to real bodies than to dummy bodies. This feature of
synesthetic mirror-touch might be related to a more general dif-
ferential susceptibility to the involvement of somatosensory and
interoceptive cortices into embodied simulation found in fMRI
studies with non-synesthetic healthy subjects (Ebisch et al., 2008,
2011). This suggests that top-down processes may also mod-
ulate the intensity of the synesthetic mirror-touch experience
(Fitzgibbon et al., 2010; Holle et al., 2011). Different potential
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mechanisms of mirror-sensory synesthesia are discussed in the
literature. The most widely proposed underlying mechanism is
an over-activation of the mirror neuron system for somatosensa-
tion, significantly beyond the threshold for consciousness. Both
mirror-touch synesthetes and non-synesthetes when experiencing
and observing touch activate visuo-tactile mirroring mechanisms,
i.e., similar brain areas (partially overlapping) in premotor and
parietal regions, primary and secondary somatosensory cortices
(Blakemore et al., 2005). Nevertheless, when observing touch on
others, fMRI has revealed the difference in synesthetic as com-
pared to non-synesthetic mirror-touch, namely a greater activa-
tion within somatosensory cortices (including BA 3) as well as
bilateral activation of the anterior insula (Blakemore et al., 2005;
Keysers et al., 2010). The latter has been related to self-awareness
(Critchley et al., 2004) and processing one’s awareness of others
(Lamm and Singer, 2010). The amount of neural activity within
the insula has been shown to increase by directing attention to
one’s own emotions when viewing affective stimuli (Straube and
Miltner, 2011). Thus, the insular cortex is likely to be a candi-
date for modulating distinctions between the sources of one’s own
and another’s tactile conscious experience within the mirror-touch
system as well as an important component for constructing a self-
model from sensory-motor emulation based mechanisms of social
cognition.
These issues, however, have not been investigated thoroughly
and systematically enough by neuroimaging studies. Since it seems
that other mechanisms also may well be involved in the induc-
tion of synesthesia-like processing, other hypotheses regarding the
functional basis of the mirror-sensory phenomenon have come up.
Another potential underpinning considered in this context is asso-
ciative learning and heightened empathy (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010).
These processes are actually not mutually exclusive or contradic-
tory to the hyperactivity of the mirror neuron system. Thus, their
strengths should be pulled together in representing a more com-
plex interplay of relevant processes providing an appropriate and
full explanation of these cross-activated multisensory perceptions.
The theory of mirror-sensory synesthesia as a learned associa-
tion or a result of associative learning is encouraged by effects
of sensory-motor modulation of mirror areas found in studies
demonstrating that, e.g., ballet dancers exhibit an increased mir-
ror neuron activity when observing ballet compared to dancers
of other styles (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). This may suggest the
involvement of associative learning in the development of mirror
systems. If so, mirror-sensory synesthesia would be the result of a
learned association through sensory-motor experience mediated
by mirroring mechanisms. This is not irreconcilable with the sug-
gestion that mirror systems are over-activated in mirror-sensory
synesthesia leading to a conscious somatic sensation. Studies on
mirror-sensory experiences, especially those acquired in mirror-
pain synesthesia in amputees, suggest that they may come about
through disinhibition of systems involved in empathy for pain
and as such they may be understood as a result of enhanced
empathic capacity (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010). Visuo-tactile interac-
tion as in mirror-touch synesthesia – and generally multisensory
integration – enables the implementation of a number of social
skills related to empathy and reading other minds, e.g., under-
standing intentions, feelings, and emotional states of other people.
In the embodied simulation and sensory-motor approach to the
theory of mind and social cognition it has been postulated that
this interpersonal competence is not just an effect of rational rea-
soning about mental states of others. It seems to depend on a
special human faculty of perspective taking by simulating other
people’s aims and actions using mirror neuron systems (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998; Gallese, 2007). Social interactions based on
shared feelings and simulated experiences may be seen as a specific
kind of synesthesia-like processing. Thus, sensory-motor exchange
when observing others’ behavior may induce a concurrent motor
reaction, e.g., automatic mimicking of someone’s facial expres-
sion (Dimberg, 1982) or sensory–sensory interactions when the
empathic experience of someone’s pain elicits qualitatively similar
somatosensory experience in the observer. Cross-modal associa-
tions exhibiting synesthesia-like processing are inbuilt both into
veridical and illusory perceptions as well as into human (social)
cognition. Integrating information from cognitive, motor, and
perceptual domain, across different sensory modalities and diverse
reference frames (space, time, object, and subject) is our funda-
mental ability used every day to make sense of the reality that
surrounds us (see Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998; Sagiv et al.,
2011).
SWIMMING STYLE-COLOR SYNESTHESIA OR A NEW
VARIANT OF MIRROR-SENSORY SYNESTHESIA. FUTURE
DIRECTIONS FOR INTERPRETING THE STATE OF THE ART IN
SYNESTHESIA RESEARCH
A novel form of synesthesia, swimming style-color synesthesia, has
been discovered in two known grapheme-color synesthetes, who
are semi-professional swimmers. The visual experience or imagi-
nation of four different swimming styles (breaststroke, butterfly,
crawl, and backstroke) is synesthetically associated by them with
four different colors (Nikolic´ et al., 2011). The induction of this
kind of synesthesia took place exclusively under laboratory condi-
tions and did not require any measurements in a swimming pool.
All what subjects had to do was to take a look at photographs of
other people swimming (e.g., Figure 1) or to think about/mentally
visualize a given swimming style. This was sufficient to elicit their
color experience.
FIGURE 1 | An example photograph shown subjects in the study of
Nikolic´ et al. (2011).
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FIGURE 2 | Stimuli used in the Stroop test: Example pictures of a person swimming butterfly stroke, painted either in a subject’s synesthetic color
(congruent) or in one of his non-synesthetic colors (incongruent). Reprint from Nikolic´ et al. (2011).
Not only subjects’ reports were taken into account, but also two
standard tests for synesthesia, the consistency test, and the Stroop
task, provided objective evidence for the existence of swimming
style-color synesthesia (see Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Odgaard
et al., 1999; Mroczko et al., 2009). Swimming style-color synes-
thetes reported significantly more consistent colors than control
non-synesthetes trained in these associations. Furthermore, in a
Stroop task the color naming times accelerated when the color of
the colored photograph was congruent with the synesthetic color
of the presented swimming style and slowed down when the color
was incongruent (Figure 2).
Hence, swimming style-color synesthesia is a genuine form
of synesthesia similar to other common types of the phenom-
enon, such as grapheme-color synesthesia or colored hearing,
although mostly related to mirror-sensory variants. As such swim-
ming style-color synesthesia might be understood as mirror-
movement associated with color experience. According to our
hypothesis further brain imaging studies should reveal the respec-
tive activation of mirror systems after such multimodal, or even
multi-domain, visuo-motor stimulation. Interestingly, the current
findings demonstrate clearly that inducers of swimming style-
color synesthesia do not have to be modality-dependent sensations
directly; the activation of kinesthetic simulation does suffice. The
mirror based embodied emulation of another’s action eliciting
synesthetic concurrents can be interpreted in terms of cross-
domain integration which fits well with the above mentioned
cognitive account of synesthesia as an overall epistemic ability,
the unity of cognition (Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, in press). The orig-
inal study showed that this kind of synesthesia may occur even
when direct sensory or motor inputs are absent and only indirect
ones exist. This allows us to conclude on the complex nature of
the phenomenon. It is evidence for an extended case of embodied
emulation in which the synesthetic concurrent is elicited without
any direct motoric stimulation, only through kinesthetic emula-
tion activated by the mental visualization of a certain swimming
style. This means, the motor imagery of a certain swimming style
seems to produce motor and somatosensory activations in form of
the mirror system based motor emulations. The latter ones, based
on the individual connections, lead to synesthetic color sensa-
tions. This form of synesthesia has some special features allowing
the separation of direct sensory inputs, i.e., motor and proprio-
ceptive inputs during the act of swimming, from those that evoke
mental emulations, i.e., pictures, thoughts, or words related to
respective swimming activities. Hence, the observation of a pic-
ture representing a swimming action may induce the creation of
the sensory-motor emulation on a higher conceptual level. This
again supports the possibility of a form of semantically driven
synesthesia. Obviously, the fact that the synesthetes did not have
to undergo any physical exercise does not imply that their motor
system was entirely silent. Regardless whether it was a mirror based
embodied simulation, a motor imagery based embodied emula-
tion, or a result of the action concept activation, there is a motor
neural representation of action even in the absence of any explicit
motor behavior.
What enables the direct matching between the visual rep-
resentation of an action, its motor representation, and further
synesthetic color representation is still a matter of questions and
speculations (see Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Early forms of automatic
imitation of adult facial and manual gestures by human neonates
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, 1983, 1994) seem to suggest some
hard-wired mechanisms coupling action observation with action
execution. The traditional view on synesthesia as a form of cross-
wiring between senses, would suggest that the above described
phenomenon could arise only by providing corresponding motor
inputs directly. To the contrary, the referred study indicated that
no direct motor or somatosensory stimulation is necessary. To
validate experiences characteristic for synesthesia from the third
person perspective, it was sufficient to activate the respective emu-
lations by showing pictures of swimming persons. Therefore, we
can conclude that visualization of a given swimming style, be it
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perceptual or imaginary may induce a corresponding synesthetic
color experience in the absence of any overt muscular activation.
On the basis of these results as well as of findings concerning the
inducing role of imagined graphemes in grapheme-color synesthe-
sia (Frith and Paulesu, 1997; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a)
and sensory-motor contingency in observing dancers of ballet and
capoeira (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006) the following general-
ization to swimming style-color synesthesia seems to be legitimate:
kinesthetic emulation triggers concurrent color sensations, much
like the original motor input itself. If the activation of motor emu-
lations is sufficient for the concurrent to be evoked, other cases
of synesthesia and synesthesia-like processes may be revealed in
which particular body movements serve as inducers, e.g., differ-
ent styles and techniques in sports. This refers not only to motion
and behavior. Since producing vicarious activations enables the
observer of another person’s sensation, emotion, or action to feel
as if he were experiencing that sensation, emotion, or perform-
ing that action himself, triggering synesthetic experiences may be
mediated by the activation of a specific model that constitutes
an internal, brain-based emulation of the perceived event, and of
organism-environment interactions. The hypothesis can imme-
diately be applied to the category of emotions – already known
cases of emotion driven synesthesia (e.g., emotion to color synes-
thesia, personalities inducing colors, smells, or touch; see Ward,
2004; Sinha, 2009) might well be extended to inducers in form of
observed emotions experienced by other people.
Also, distinctive features of swimming style-color synesthesia
may explain why, in synesthetes, only some types of modal-
ity/domain related emulations produce synesthesia. Both synes-
thetes have been active swimmers since early childhood. This sup-
ports the hypothesis that at that time, when synesthesias are known
to develop (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Harrison and Baron-Cohen,
1997), the categories of inducers that are especially disposed to
acquire synesthesia are those that play a central role in the child’s
life. Synesthesia seems to develop most easily for activities and
emulations of them that children spend most time with and that
possess predominant representational contents in the course of
learning and playing. Therefore, theoretically there is no rea-
son to exclude any kind of mental representation from being a
possible inducer of concurrent synesthetic experiences. The key
aspect seems to be the frequency with which this potential trigger
is being employed by a young synesthete. The present results imply
that the initiation of synesthetic associations may be regulated by
the ability of eliciting emulations of regularly experienced events,
properties, or situations.
HYPERBINDING, EMULATIVE SEMANTICS, AND THE THEORY
OF NEURO-FRAMES
Swimming style-color synesthesia may also be viewed as a non-
standard binding pattern between the neurobiologically realized
attributes of color and bodily motion. Binding patterns between
intra- and cross-modal as well as cross-domain attributes, includ-
ing i.a. perceptual, proprioceptive, emotional, numerical, and
motor attributes, in ordinary cases play an important role in
the formation of concepts. As an underlying theoretical frame-
work, the theory of neuro-frames (Werning and Maye, 2005, 2007;
Werning, 2012) has been developed. This neuro-cognitive model
of situated conceptualization (Barsalou, 2008) postulates neuro-
frames as neuronal bases for concepts. A frame is defined for a
large domain of things and contains a fixed set of attributes, each of
which allows for a number of different values (Barsalou,1992). The
attributes in question are not constrained to perceptual modalities,
but may involve motor attributes as well as further attributes (in
this paper we are focusing on the interrelation between perceptual
and motor attributes). Frames can be nested hierarchically and
mutual constraints between attributes (e.g., between states of an
FIGURE 3 | Hypothetical fragment of the frame for the concept
[banana]. The substance concept to be decomposed is marked by a
double-circle as the referring node of the frame. The labeled arrows denote
attributes, the nodes their values. Nodes are themselves regarded as
concepts and thus as conceptual parts of the central concept. In English,
feature attributes (shown on the right) are frequently lexicalized – their
arguments typically enter possessive constructions like The color of the
banana is yellow or The banana has the color yellow. Based on linguistic
and neurobiological evidence, we assume that affordances often relate to
body parts and hence use the convention “@+body part.” Formally,
attributes are mappings from domains of some type into domains of some
other type. Petersen and Werning (2007) provide an explicit account of
frames using a calculus of typed feature hierarchies and incorporating
typicality effects.
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object and actions directed to it) and between larger frames can
be incorporated (see Figure 3).
For many attributes involved in perceptual processing one can
anatomically identify cortical correlates. Those areas often exhibit
a twofold topological structure and justify the notion of a feature
map: (i) a receptor topology (e.g., retinotopy in vision, somatotopy
in touch): neighboring regions of neurons code for neighboring
regions of the receptor; and (ii) a feature topology: neighboring
regions of neurons code for similar features. With respect to the
monkey, more than 30 cortical areas forming feature maps are
experimentally known for vision alone (Felleman and van Essen,
1991).
Motor attributes may also be parts of frames and appear to have
cortical correlates, predominantly in the premotor and motor cor-
tex (Werning, 2010). The cortical organization of motor control
with regard to the effectors follows similar topological principles
as the cortical organization in perception with regard to the recep-
tors. The discovery of the so-called canonical motor neurons in
the mirror neuron system, activated by the sight of an object to
which a certain action is applicable (Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), may provide a basis to integrate
affordances (Gibson, 1977) – specific qualities of the object that
allow the agent to perform particular actions upon it – into frames.
Figure 4 shows a number of neural maps that relate to various
attributes of frames.
Canonical neurons are involved in mechanisms for recogniz-
ing object affordances and contribute to the semantic knowledge
about the object (Sahin and Erdogan, 2009). Hence, the acti-
vation of the mirror system brings its multimodal neurons to
respond not only to action performance, but also to visual, audi-
tory, somatosensory, and proprioceptive signals. This suggests that
related processes are grounded functionally by multimodal cir-
cuits (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
In particular, the intraparietal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule
are involved in multisensory integration and vicarious sensory-
motor activations (Bremmer et al., 2001; Rozzi et al., 2006; Ishida
et al., 2010; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). These regions, able
to receive visual input, are directly connected with each other and
with the somatosensory cortex (i.e., BA 2; Pons and Kaas, 1986;
Lewis and van Essen, 2000) integrating tactile and proprioceptive
stimuli as well as containing shared sensory-motor representa-
tions (Keysers et al., 2010). These multimodal circuits exhibit some
basic semantic features. The activation of a specific action con-
cept, e.g., expressing an affordance or any other motor attribute,
induces the activation of the multimodal neural circuits (Pulver-
müller and Fadiga, 2010). In swimming style-color synesthesia the
functioning of such a multimodal mechanism might take place
when synesthetes swim, see other person swimming, when they
see a swimming pool and recognize this object affordances or use
a concrete action concept such as for example [breaststroke].
The fact that values of different attributes may be instantiated
by the same object, but are processed in distinct regions of cor-
tex is a version of the binding problem (Treisman, 1993; Tacca,
2010): how is this information integrated in an object-specific
way? How can the color and taste of a banana be represented in
distinct regions of cortex, although they are part of the representa-
tion of one and the same object? A prominent and experimentally
FIGURE 4 | Cortical realizations of frame attributes. (A) Fragment of
the neural feature map for the attribute orientation of cat V1 (adapted from
Shmuel and Grinvald, 2000). The arrows indicate the polar topology of the
orientation values represented within each hypercolumn. Hypercolumns
are arranged in a retinotopic topology. (B) Color band (ca. 1 mm2) from the
thin stripes of macaque V2 (adapted from Xiao et al., 2003). The values of
the attribute color are arranged in a topology that follows the similarity of
hue as defined by the Commission Internationale de l’Eclairages
(xy -chromaticity). The topology among the various color bands of V2 is
retinotopic. (C) Neural map (ca. 250 mm2) of forelimb movement in
macaque primary motor (F1) and dorsal premotor cortex (F2, F7) (adapted
from Raos et al., 2003). The overarching topology is somatotopic from
proximal to distal movement as shown by the arrow. Due to the size of
the region one may expect it to comprise maps for more specific motor
attributes. C: central sulcus, AS, and AI: superior, respectively, inferior
arcuate sulcus.
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well supported solution postulates oscillatory neural synchro-
nization as a mechanism of binding: Clusters of neurons that
are indicative of different properties sometimes show synchro-
nous oscillatory activity, but only when the properties indicated
are instantiated by the same object in the perceptual field; oth-
erwise they are firing asynchronously. Synchronous oscillation,
thus, might be regarded as fulfilling the task of binding vari-
ous property representations together to form the representation
of an object having these properties (Singer, 1999). Using oscil-
latory networks as biologically motivated models, it could be
demonstrated how the topological organization of information
in the cortex by mechanisms of synchronization may yield a logi-
cally structured semantics of concepts (Maye and Werning, 2004;
Werning and Maye, 2007). Compositionality theorems have been
provided (Werning, 2005). Oscillation functions play the role of
object concepts. Clusters of feature sensitive neurons play the role
of attributive concepts. The experimental findings by Schnitzler et
al. (2006) on the essential role of neural synchronization for action
control may justify the extension of the synchrony-based neuro-
frame approach from features to affordances. It should be noted
that the envisaged semantics is one of emulation: the neuronal
structure is partially isomorphic to a (model-theoretic) model of
the representational content. A concept like [banana] thus inter-
relates i.a. sensoric and motoric emulations: Having the concept
[banana] means being able to emulate what a banana would look,
taste, feel, and smell like and being able to emulate actions afforded
by a banana. Triggering the concept activates the respective sen-
soric and motoric cerebral regions for the purpose of emulation
even in the absence of a real banana. The neuro-frame captures
how the various sensoric and motoric emulations are linked to
each other. Emulative semantics is a non-symbolic, embodied, but
still compositional semantics and might be used to link conceptual
resources employed in perception and motor planning to linguistic
meaning (Werning, 2012).
Support for the theory of neuro-frames also comes from a
number of neuro-linguistic studies. Based on a review of neu-
robiological data, Pulvermüller et al. (1999) suggests that neural
assemblies that pertain to the sensory-motor cortices and are
bound by neural synchronization play an important role in under-
standing the meanings of words and sentences. These cortical
sensory-motor action and perception circuits are interdependent
in language comprehension. Neuroimaging investigations have
shown that perception and understanding of stimuli depend on
motor circuits, i.e., specific motor activations can be found when
subjects understand speech sounds, word meanings, semantic cat-
egories, and sentence structures (Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010).
FMRI studies (Pulvermüller, 2005) regarding the understanding
of verbs, e.g., hint at a differential top-down activation of motor
and pre-motors areas. We know that the understanding of con-
crete nouns like hammer, for which not only features, but also
affordances are salient, results in an activity distributed over the
premotor and the visual cortex (Martin et al., 1996; Martin, 2007).
The hypothesis that words for substance concepts arouse more
widely distributed activity than words for attributive concepts has
also been supported by EEG studies (Rappelsberger et al., 2000).
Brain areas involved in motor control contribute to neural net-
works in which verb representations are grounded, e.g., studies
on motor deficits such as Parkinson disease reveal impairment of
patients’ action naming (Rodríguez-Ferreiro et al., 2009). Higher-
order abilities such as thinking or linguistic concept use are based
in sensory-motor abilities.
Unlike in normal concept formation, where perceptual and
motor attributes forming a concept are bound together into a
frame (e.g., the concept [banana] in Figure 3), synesthesia may
generally be regarded as a case of hyperbinding (Emrich et al.,
2002, 2004; Sagiv and Robertson, 2005; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, in
press). Attributes that do not form a sensible concept frame are
bound together. This is especially striking in the case of visuo-
motor or mirror-movement to color synesthesia as observed in
swimming style-color synesthesia. Certain attributes of bodily
motion are contingently linked to the attribute color. An addi-
tional synesthetic attribute of the concurrent is not only bound
additively to the attributes of the inducer, it is experienced integra-
tively. Also, one and the same attribute of the synesthetic inducer
may be integrated with two values, the ordinary and the synes-
thetic one. E.g., in grapheme-color synesthesia the letter “A” is
bound to the values “black” and “red” of the attribute color. A
plausible hypothesis for the wide-ranging phenomenon of synes-
thesia thus might be that it results from a process of hyperbinding.
If one assumes the neurobiological hypothesis that binding is
achieved by some sort of neural synchronization between neu-
rons that code for attribute values (perceptual features, motor
affordances, etc.) then hyperbinding might be neurobiologically
manifested by “too much” synchrony between “too many” neural
feature maps and clusters in “too many” cortical regions. Alterna-
tive hypothesis of how binding is achieved might lead to analogous
predictions.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper undertakes the broader attempt of understanding the
role of sensory-motor processes in synesthesia as part of a theory of
mental representation as emulation. This regards the involvement
of emulations in higher-level cognitive functions such as visual and
motor imagery, object and action recognition, iconic memory, the
representation of object and action concepts and language com-
prehension (Rumiati and Caramazza, 2005; Rumiati et al., 2010).
The reconsideration of mental processes involved in synesthesia-
like experiences proposed here will lead to vital implications not
only for synesthesia research, but also generally for theories of per-
ception and cognition. The wide spectrum of synesthesia-like pro-
cessing extends itself from multimodal sensory or sensory-motor
phenomena, through universal cross-modal or cross-domain cor-
respondences to linguistic metaphors (Day, 1996; Martino and
Marks, 2001; Sagiv and Ward, 2006), linking sensory-motor con-
tingency and emulation with synesthetic associations, language
comprehension, and social competencies. The interpersonal expe-
rience of mirror-sensory synesthesia is thought to rely on hyperac-
tivity of the same brain mechanisms that we all use when observing
another person’s experiences. It therefore offers insights into how
our brain shapes interpersonal representations between self and
others.
The comparison between different psychological phenomena
employing synesthesia-like processing as well as the use of a
peculiar type of synesthesia have the potential of challenging
conventional thinking on this phenomenon and the existing inter-
pretations. If swimming style as a kinesthetic simulation can
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induce synesthetic color perception, then interpretations in terms
of bottom-up hard-wired structural connectivity, postulated not
only between word/grapheme form and color areas in grapheme-
color synesthesia, but generally in synesthesia research, may be
challenged. Interpretations in terms of more top-down associa-
tions that are related to complex semantic representations might
fit better.
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